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ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 4) — Information Security Sheet: IT Security / Cyber Security

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This is the part 4 of the series about the TISAX label: TISAX getting started: A Deep Dive into the ISA Assessment Workbook (part 1).

ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 4) — Information Security Sheet: IT Security / Cyber Security

Chapter 5 — IT Security / Cyber Security

This is the largest chapter in the Information Security sheet. It covers the technical and operational security measures applied to IT infrastructure, from encryption and network controls to development practices and cloud usage.

5.1 Cryptography

This subchapter addresses the use of cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.

5.1.1 — To what extent is the use of cryptographic procedures managed?

All cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and key lengths used within the organization must meet recognized industry standards for their respective application. This applies across the board: encryption at rest, in transit, for signing, and for hashing. The should-level expects formal technical rules defining encryption requirements by information classification, and a cryptography concept covering algorithm choices, key strengths, key management, and the handling of lost or compromised keys. For high protection needs, key sovereignty requirements must be explicitly determined and fulfilled — particularly relevant when external services process encrypted data and the organization needs assurance that the provider cannot access keys.

Evidence includes a cryptography policy or technical standard, documentation of algorithms and key lengths used, key management procedures, and for high protection needs, documentation of key sovereignty arrangements.

5.1.2 — To what extent is information protected during transfer?

All network services used to transfer information must be identified and documented. Policies governing the use of these services must align with information classification requirements. Protection measures against unauthorized access and tampering during transfer must be implemented. The should-level adds requirements for correct addressing, content or transport encryption matched to classification, and verification that remote access connections meet adequate security standards. For high protection needs, information must be transferred in encrypted form — with documented compensating measures where encryption is not feasible. For very high protection needs, content-level encryption is required, not merely transport-level.

Evidence includes a data transfer policy, a list of approved network services, encryption configurations, and at higher protection levels, evidence of content encryption implementation.

5.2 Operations Security

This subchapter covers the day-to-day security of IT operations: managing changes, separating environments, protecting against malware, logging, handling vulnerabilities, auditing systems, managing networks, and maintaining continuity and backup capabilities.

5.2.1 — To what extent are changes managed?

Any change to the organization, business processes, or IT systems must consider information security requirements. The should-level requires a formal approval procedure for changes, impact assessments, planning and testing for changes affecting security, and documented fallback procedures. For high protection needs, compliance with security requirements must be verified both during and after change implementation.

Evidence includes a change management process, change request and approval records, testing documentation, and for high protection needs, post-implementation security verification records.

5.2.2 — To what extent are development and testing environments separated from operational environments?

Before deciding on separation, a risk assessment of IT systems must determine whether separation into development, test, and production environments is necessary. Where it is, separation must be implemented. The should-level adds more specific requirements: no development tools in production, no real production data in test environments unless appropriately protected, and documented requirements for each environment type.

Evidence includes the risk assessment that informed the separation decision, environment configuration documentation, and access control records showing restricted cross-environment access.

5.2.3 — To what extent are IT systems protected against malware?

Protection requirements against malware must be determined, and both technical and organizational measures must be defined and implemented. The should-level expects unnecessary network services to be disabled, access to remaining services to be restricted, malware protection software to be installed and automatically updated, and received files to be scanned before opening. No additional high or very high requirements apply.

Evidence includes the malware protection policy, configuration records for endpoint protection tools, and update verification records.

5.2.4 — To what extent are event logs recorded and analysed?

Information security requirements for logging must be determined and implemented. Activities of system administrators and privileged users must be logged. Systems must be assessed to determine appropriate log scope and retention. The should-level adds escalation procedures for relevant events, log integrity protection, and adequate retention periods. For high protection needs, contractual logging requirements must be met, and connections and disconnections of external networks — such as remote maintenance sessions — must be logged. For very high protection needs, any access to data of very high classification must be logged to the extent technically feasible and legally permissible.

Evidence includes a logging policy, log retention configuration, log integrity controls, and at higher protection levels, specific log samples or monitoring dashboards showing coverage of required event types.

5.2.5 — To what extent are vulnerabilities identified and addressed?

The organization must actively gather information about technical vulnerabilities affecting its IT systems — from manufacturer advisories, public CVE databases, and internal assessments — and evaluate them for relevance and severity using a structured method such as CVSS. Affected systems must be identified and remediated within an appropriate time. The should-level requires adequate patch management, including testing patches before deployment, implementing risk-minimizing measures while patches are pending, and verifying successful installation.

Evidence includes a vulnerability management procedure, subscription records for vulnerability feeds, patch management records, and evidence of CVSS-based prioritization.

5.2.6 — To what extent are IT systems and services technically checked (system and service audit)?

Technical audits of IT systems and services must be scoped, coordinated with system operators, and recorded in a traceable way. The should-level expects risk-aware planning of audits, regular execution by qualified personnel using appropriate tools, and documentation of findings and remediation. For high protection needs, critical IT systems must have additional audit requirements — such as human penetration testing or risk-driven intervals — defined and applied. For very high protection needs, IT systems and services must be regularly scanned for vulnerabilities, with documented compensating measures for systems that cannot be scanned.

Evidence includes audit planning records, audit reports, remediation tracking, and at higher protection levels, penetration test reports and scheduled scanning records.

5.2.7 — To what extent is the network of the organization managed?

Requirements for network management and segmentation must be determined and implemented. The should-level defines the basis for risk-based segmentation: limiting which IT systems can connect to the network, using appropriate security technologies, and considering performance, trust, and safety criteria. For high protection needs, additional requirements apply: IT systems must be authenticated on the network, management interfaces must be access-restricted, and specific risks — such as wireless access, remote maintenance, and IoT — must be addressed.

Evidence includes a network architecture diagram, segmentation documentation, firewall and access control configurations, and for high protection needs, network authentication records and management interface access controls.

5.2.8 — To what extent is continuity planning for IT services in place?

Critical IT services must be identified and their business impact documented. Requirements and responsibilities for continuity and recovery of those services must be known and fulfilled. The should-level expects identification of critical IT systems, appropriate classification and security measures for those systems, and planning that covers scenarios including DDoS attacks, ransomware, and power failures. For high protection needs, RTO targets must be defined in continuity plans and reflected in SLAs with external service providers. For very high protection needs, continuity plans must be coordinated with external service providers and must support continuance of essential functions with minimal or no operational interruption, including hot standby or rapid failover capabilities.

Evidence includes a business continuity and IT recovery plan, risk impact analysis, RTO and RPO documentation, SLAs with external providers, and for very high protection needs, failover test records and coordinated plans with key providers.

5.2.9 — To what extent is the backup and recovery of data and IT services ensured?

Backup concepts must exist for relevant IT systems, addressing confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup data. Recovery concepts must also exist for relevant IT services. The should-level requires a comprehensive backup and recovery concept per IT service that accounts for inter-service dependencies and recovery sequencing. For high protection needs, backup and recovery concepts must be methodically reviewed at regular intervals, restore capability must be tested, and RPO and RTO targets must be defined. For very high protection needs, backups must be supplemented with offline procedures, immutable backups, or isolated IAM technology to protect against ransomware scenarios. Restore procedures must be technically tested at regular intervals. Geographical redundancy must be considered.

Evidence includes backup configuration documentation, recovery plans, test records proving restore capability, and for very high protection needs, immutable backup configuration records and geographically redundant storage records.

5.3 System Acquisitions, Requirement Management and Development

This subchapter covers how security is built into IT systems from the start — whether acquired from vendors or built in-house — and how the organization manages its relationships with cloud and external service providers at the technical level.

5.3.1 — To what extent is information security considered in new or further developed IT systems?

Security requirements must be embedded into both development and acquisition processes. This includes security requirements in specification documents, vendor recommendations and best practices, and fail-safe design principles. Security requirements must also be considered throughout the development lifecycle, including testing and deployment. The should-level adds formal requirement specifications referencing security standards. For very high protection needs, purpose-built or significantly customized software must undergo security testing — such as penetration testing — at commissioning, at major changes, and at regular intervals thereafter.

Evidence includes requirement specifications containing security criteria, development lifecycle documentation, and for very high protection needs, penetration test reports.

5.3.2 — To what extent are requirements for network services defined?

Information security requirements for network services must be determined and fulfilled. The should-level expects formal SLAs to document agreed requirements and adequate redundancy to be implemented. For high protection needs, traffic monitoring procedures — such as flow analyses and availability measurements — must be defined and carried out to detect anomalies and verify quality.

Evidence includes a network service requirements document, SLA agreements, and for high protection needs, traffic monitoring reports or dashboards.

5.3.3 — To what extent is the return and secure removal of information assets from external IT services regulated?

When terminating an external IT service, the organization must have a defined and implemented procedure for securely removing or retrieving its information assets. The should-level requires this procedure to be documented, kept current, and contractually embedded with the service provider.

Evidence includes a termination and data retrieval procedure, contracts containing data return and deletion clauses, and records of executed terminations.

5.3.4 — To what extent is information protected in shared external IT services?

In multi-tenant cloud or shared hosting environments, effective logical segregation must prevent other organizations’ users from accessing the organization’s information. The should-level expects the provider’s segregation concept to be documented and regularly reviewed, covering data, functions, software, operating systems, storage, and networking, as well as risk assessments for third-party software running in shared environments.

Evidence includes the cloud or hosting provider’s segregation documentation, contractual guarantees of tenant isolation, and internal review records.

 

The post ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 4) — Information Security Sheet: IT Security / Cyber Security first appeared on Sorin Mustaca – Security & Technology.

ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 3) — Information Security Sheet: Human Resources, Physical Security, Identity and Access Management

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This is the part 3 of the series about the TISAX label: TISAX getting started: A Deep Dive into the ISA Assessment Workbook (part 1).

 

ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 3) — Information Security Sheet: Human Resources, Physical Security, Identity and Access Management

Chapter 2 — Human Resources

This chapter addresses the people dimension of information security: how the organization selects staff for sensitive roles, contractually binds them to security obligations, trains and raises awareness among them, and manages the risks associated with working outside the office.

Note: Chapter 2 in ISA 6.0.3 contains only one structural level beneath the chapter header. Controls are numbered in the format 2.1.x but there is no separately titled subchapter 2.1 header. The implicit grouping covers general HR security measures.

2.1.1 — To what extent is the qualification of employees for sensitive work fields ensured?

The organization must identify which roles are sensitive from an information security perspective, define the qualification requirements for those roles, and verify the identity of candidates before hiring. The should-level extends this to personal suitability checks — interviews, reference checks, or more rigorous methods depending on the role’s sensitivity. There are no additional requirements at high or very high protection need levels.

Evidence includes a list or classification of sensitive roles, defined job profiles with security-relevant criteria, and records of identity verification performed during hiring.

2.1.2 — To what extent is all staff contractually bound to comply with information security policies?

Every employee must be under a non-disclosure obligation and must be formally committed to complying with information security policies. The should-level adds an expectation that the NDA extends beyond the employment period, that security aspects are embedded in employment contracts, and that there is a procedure for handling violations.

Evidence includes employment contract templates containing NDA clauses and information security obligations, and any documented procedures for managing breaches of these obligations.

2.1.3 — To what extent is staff made aware of and trained with respect to the risks arising from the handling of information?

All employees must receive training and awareness activities related to information security. The should-level defines a minimum scope for that training: the organization’s information security policy, how to report security events, how to respond to malware, how to handle user accounts and passwords, and physical security measures. Training must be refreshed at regular intervals.

Evidence includes a training concept or awareness program, training records showing which employees completed which modules, and records of the training schedule and frequency.

2.1.4 — To what extent is mobile work regulated?

Working outside defined security zones — home offices, client sites, travel — introduces risks that must be addressed by specific requirements. The must-level requires that the organization has determined and implemented requirements covering secure access to and handling of information in both electronic and physical form during remote work. The should-level adds considerations for travel-specific risks, including measures for travel to security-sensitive countries. For high protection needs, protective measures against overhearing and visual exposure — such as privacy screens and secure communication practices — must be implemented.

Evidence includes a teleworking or remote work security policy, records showing the policy has been communicated to staff, and for high protection needs, documented technical and organizational measures against visual and acoustic compromise.

Chapter 3 — Physical Security

This chapter addresses the physical layer of information security: the security zones where information is processed, the hardware and media that carries it, and the mobile devices used to access it outside secure perimeters.

Note: Like chapter 2, chapter 3 contains no separately titled subchapter. Controls run directly as 3.1.x.

3.1.1 — To what extent are security zones managed to protect information assets?

A security zone concept must exist that maps protection requirements to physical areas — offices, server rooms, delivery zones, reception areas. The concept must define what protective measures apply in each zone, and zones must be demarcated with visible or enforced perimeters. The should-level adds expectations for access rights management procedures, visitor management policies, and rules for using mobile IT devices inside secure zones. For high protection needs, measures against overhearing and visual exposure inside or near sensitive zones must be implemented.

Evidence includes the security zone documentation, access control records, visitor logs, and for high protection needs, records of anti-eavesdropping or visual screening measures.

3.1.2 — Superseded by 1.6.3, 5.2.8, and 5.2.9

This control is no longer active in ISA 6.0.3. Its content has been redistributed into crisis management (1.6.3), IT continuity planning (5.2.8), and backup and recovery (5.2.9). No assessment is performed against 3.1.2 as a standalone control.

3.1.3 — To what extent is the handling of supporting assets managed?

Physical assets that support information processing — servers, workstations, storage media, paper — must have defined requirements covering their entire lifecycle: transport, storage, repair, loss reporting, return, and secure disposal. The should-level is not populated for this control. For high protection needs, supporting assets must be disposed of in accordance with recognized standards — for example, ISO 21964 at Security Level 4 or equivalent — to prevent data recovery from discarded equipment.

Evidence includes a hardware and media lifecycle policy, disposal records, and for high protection needs, certificates of secure destruction.

3.1.4 — To what extent is the handling of mobile IT devices and mobile data storage devices managed?

Mobile devices and removable storage must meet defined security requirements covering encryption, access protection such as PIN or password, and appropriate marking. The should-level adds device registration and user communication about risks. For high protection needs, general encryption of mobile storage devices or the information stored on them is required. Where encryption is not technically feasible, equally effective compensating measures must be implemented.

Evidence includes a mobile device management policy, encryption configuration records, device inventory, and for high protection needs, evidence of encryption enforcement or compensating controls.

Chapter 4 — Identity and Access Management

This chapter covers the mechanisms by which the organization controls who can access what — from physical identification tokens to digital user accounts and the logic for granting or revoking rights.

4.1 Identity Management

This subchapter addresses physical and digital means of identification and the authentication procedures that verify a user’s identity before granting system access.

4.1.1 — To what extent is the use of identification means managed?

Physical and digital identification tokens — keys, access cards, cryptographic tokens, certificates — must be managed across their full lifecycle: creation, issuance, return, revocation, and destruction. Validity periods must be defined and traceability maintained, along with a process for handling lost means. The should-level expects these tokens to be produced only under controlled conditions. For high protection needs, validity periods must be actively limited to an appropriate duration, and a blocking strategy for lost tokens must be both defined and implemented as far as technically possible.

Evidence includes an identification means register, lifecycle management procedures, records of issued and returned tokens, and for high protection needs, proof of validity enforcement and loss response procedures.

4.1.2 — To what extent is the user access to IT services and IT systems secured?

Authentication procedures must be chosen based on a risk assessment that considers the attack surface of each system, including whether systems are directly internet-accessible. State-of-the-art authentication must be applied. The should-level requires strong passwords at minimum and stronger mechanisms for privileged users. For high protection needs, enhanced measures such as continuous session monitoring, automatic logout, and brute force prevention must be implemented based on the risk profile. For very high protection needs, access to data of very high classification must require strong two-factor authentication.

Evidence includes a risk assessment underpinning authentication choices, authentication configuration documentation, and at higher protection levels, records of enhanced access controls and monitoring.

4.1.3 — To what extent are user accounts and login information securely managed and applied?

User accounts must follow a clear lifecycle: creation, modification, and deletion all managed with oversight. Accounts must be unique and personal. Generic or shared accounts must be restricted to cases where traceability is genuinely not needed. Accounts must be disabled immediately when a user leaves or changes role. The should-level adds expectations around minimal default-privilege accounts, disabling of default manufacturer credentials, formal authorization procedures for creating accounts, and regular account reviews.

Evidence includes a user account management procedure, records of account creation and deactivation, and periodic access reviews.

4.2 Access Management

This subchapter addresses how access rights are granted, reviewed, and revoked — and how the organization ensures that rights remain aligned with actual need.

4.2.1 — To what extent are access rights assigned and managed?

Access rights must be managed based on the need-to-know and least privilege principles. The process for requesting, approving, and revoking rights must be defined. Rights must be revoked when no longer needed. The should-level expects role-based access control, with rights assigned to roles rather than individuals where possible, and regular reviews to identify stale or excessive rights. For high protection needs, access rights must be approved by a designated internal information officer. For very high protection needs, data of very high classification must be stored in encrypted form so that even privileged users cannot access it without appropriate authorization, and access rights must be reviewed more frequently.

Evidence includes an access rights management procedure, role definitions, access review records, approval records, and at higher protection levels, encryption configuration and formal information officer sign-off records.

 

The post ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 3) — Information Security Sheet: Human Resources, Physical Security, Identity and Access Management first appeared on Sorin Mustaca – Security & Technology.

ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 2) — Information Security Sheet: IS Policies and Organization

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This is the part 2 of the series about the TISAX label: TISAX getting started: A Deep Dive into the ISA Assessment Workbook (part 1).

 

ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 2) — Information Security Sheet: IS Policies and Organization

 

Chapter 1 — IS Policies and Organization

This chapter establishes the governance foundation of the entire ISMS. It covers formal structures, policies, and management decisions that make information security a deliberate, managed discipline rather than an informal practice. Without a solid chapter 1, everything downstream has no authoritative basis.

1.1 Information Security Policies

This subchapter asks whether the organization has committed its approach to information security in writing and whether that commitment comes from the right level of authority.

1.1.1 — To what extent are information security policies available?

The organization must have at least one formally approved information security policy. This is not a technical document. It is a management-level statement that defines what information security means for the organization, why it matters, what the objectives are, and what roles and responsibilities exist. The policy must be adapted to the organization’s specific context, not copied wholesale from a template.

The must-level requirements demand that the policy exists, that it has been formally released by management, and that it articulates the objectives and significance of information security. The should-level requirements raise the bar: the policy should also reflect the organization’s strategic direction, applicable legal obligations, and contractual requirements. It should state what consequences follow from non-compliance, reference other relevant security policies, and be subject to periodic review. There are no additional requirements at the high or very high protection need levels for this control.

Evidence an auditor will look for: the policy document itself, a visible approval signature or release notation, version history showing periodic reviews, and communication records proving staff awareness.

1.2 Organization of Information Security

This subchapter addresses how information security is structured within the organization — who owns it, who is responsible for what, how it connects to projects, and how external IT service providers fit into the accountability picture.

1.2.1 — To what extent is information security managed within the organization?

The organization must have a functioning ISMS with a defined scope, management endorsement, and monitoring mechanisms that give leadership visibility into the state of information security. Management must have actively commissioned and approved the ISMS. Passive acceptance is not enough.

Evidence includes the ISMS scope statement, documented management approval, and any governance reporting tools or dashboards used by leadership to track security performance.

1.2.2 — To what extent are information security responsibilities organized?

Roles and responsibilities for information security must be defined, documented, and assigned to real, qualified people. Those people must be known within the organization and to relevant external parties. The should-level pushes toward a documented organizational structure covering all relevant security roles. For high protection needs, the control adds a requirement for appropriate separation of duties to prevent conflicts of interest — for example, ensuring the person who configures systems is not the same person auditing them.

Evidence includes role descriptions, organizational charts, and records of qualifications for people in security roles.

1.2.3 — To what extent are information security requirements considered in projects?

All projects, regardless of their nature, must be classified from an information security perspective so that relevant security requirements are identified early. The should-level expects a documented procedure for this classification, risk assessments at project initiation and when changes occur, and documented measures for any identified risks. For high protection needs, those measures must be reviewed regularly throughout the project lifecycle and reassessed whenever the risk picture changes.

Evidence includes a project classification procedure, risk assessment records for projects, and documented security measures tied to specific projects.

1.2.4 — To what extent are the responsibilities between external IT service providers and the own organization defined?

When the organization uses external IT services, it must be clear who is responsible for which security requirements. A shared model — where both parties have responsibilities — must be explicitly defined, not assumed. The should-level requires that configurations are implemented and documented based on security requirements and that responsible staff are adequately trained. For high protection needs, a formal list of all affected external IT services and their responsible providers must exist, the applicability of ISA controls must be verified and documented, service configurations must be included in regular security assessments, and proof must be available that the provider actually implements the agreed security requirements.

Evidence includes contracts or service agreements with security clauses, RACI matrices or responsibility assignment records, and provider compliance documentation.

1.3 Asset Management

This subchapter addresses whether the organization knows what information assets it holds, how they are classified, and whether the tools and external services used to process them are managed with appropriate controls.

1.3.1 — To what extent are information assets identified and recorded?

Information assets — the core data and knowledge that matter to the organization — must be identified and recorded, with a responsible owner assigned. The supporting technical assets that process those information assets must also be inventoried and assigned an owner. The should-level expects a formal catalogue that maps supporting assets to information assets and is reviewed regularly.

Evidence includes an asset inventory or register, assigned ownership records, and review logs for the catalogue.

1.3.2 — To what extent are information assets classified and managed in terms of their protection needs?

The organization must have a consistent classification scheme focused at minimum on confidentiality, and must have applied that scheme to its information assets. Handling requirements must follow from the classification. The should-level encourages the organization to also consider integrity and availability when classifying assets.

Evidence includes the classification scheme documentation, records of classification applied to specific information assets, and handling guidelines tied to each classification level.

1.3.3 — To what extent is it ensured that only evaluated and approved external IT services are used for processing the organization’s information assets?

Before using any external IT service to process organizational information, a risk assessment must be completed and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements must be considered. The service must be harmonized with the organization’s information security requirements. The should-level expects a formal approval and procurement procedure, a release process tied to protection need, and a documented inventory of approved services. No additional high or very high requirements apply beyond regular checking of approved status.

Evidence includes risk assessment records for external services, approval documentation, a register of approved external IT services, and contract clauses.

1.3.4 — To what extent is it ensured that only evaluated and approved software is used for processing the organization’s information assets?

Software must be approved before installation or use, taking into account licensing, use-case restrictions, conformance to security requirements, and the reputation of the source. Approval must also address the removal of software that is no longer needed or no longer compliant. The should-level adds expectations around managed repositories, protection of those repositories against tampering, and regular review of approvals. For very high protection needs, additional requirements — such as control or monitoring of software usage — must be determined and documented.

Evidence includes a software approval process, a software inventory or repository, records of approvals and periodic reviews, and for very high protection needs, usage monitoring records.

1.4 IS Risk Management

This subchapter addresses the central mechanism that connects threats and vulnerabilities to the organization’s information assets and produces actionable decisions.

1.4.1 — To what extent are information security risks managed?

Risk assessments must happen regularly and in response to events, not only on a fixed annual schedule. Identified risks must be assessed for probability and potential damage, documented, and assigned to a responsible risk owner. The should-level requires a formal risk management procedure, defined criteria for assessing and handling risks, and documented plans with responsible persons. Accepted risks must be explicitly approved by management. No additional high or very high protection need requirements apply.

Evidence includes risk assessment records, a risk register, documented risk treatment decisions, and management approval records for accepted risks.

1.5 Assessments

This subchapter addresses the organization’s obligation to verify that its information security policies and ISMS are actually working, through both internal reviews and independent external assessments.

1.5.1 — To what extent is compliance with information security ensured in procedures and processes?

Policies must be checked for compliance throughout the organization on a regular basis. Deviations must trigger corrective measures, and those measures must be tracked to closure. Compliance with legal and contractual information security requirements must also be verified. The should-level expects a documented plan that defines the scope, schedule, and controls covered by compliance reviews.

Evidence includes compliance review reports, records of corrective actions, and a compliance review schedule or plan.

1.5.2 — To what extent is the ISMS reviewed by an independent authority?

The ISMS must be assessed from outside the team responsible for running it — by an internal audit function, an external auditor, or another body that can provide an objective view. This must happen regularly and whenever fundamental changes occur. Corrective measures arising from such reviews must be tracked. The should-level expects results to be formally reported to management.

Evidence includes internal audit reports or third-party review reports, management reporting records, and corrective action logs.

1.6 Incident and Crisis Management

This subchapter covers the organization’s capacity to detect, respond to, and recover from security incidents and, at a higher scale, from crisis situations that threaten continuity.

1.6.1 — To what extent are information security relevant events or observations reported?

There must be a clear definition of what constitutes a reportable security event, and this definition must be known to employees and relevant stakeholders. The definition must cover personnel-related events, physical security observations, and technical/cyber events. The should-level requires a single point of contact for reporting, multiple reporting channels matched to severity, and formal obligations for employees to report. For very high protection needs, tests and exercises of the reporting process must be conducted regularly.

Evidence includes the event reporting definition and procedure, communication records or training materials proving staff awareness, and for very high protection needs, exercise records.

1.6.2 — To what extent are reported security events managed?

Once an event is reported, it must be processed without undue delay, receive an adequate response, and feed into continuous improvement through lessons learned. The should-level expects events to be categorized by type, qualified by severity, and prioritized. For high protection needs, maximum response times must be defined for each class and priority, and escalation mechanisms must be in place for events not processed within those times. For very high protection needs, event handling across different categories and priorities must be tested regularly, including simulation of rare scenarios and escalation exercises.

Evidence includes a ticketing or event management system showing processing records, defined response time SLAs, escalation procedures, and exercise or simulation records at the appropriate protection level.

1.6.3 — To what extent is the organization prepared to handle crisis situations?

A crisis is a situation where normal incident response is insufficient — for example, a major cyberattack causing infrastructure failure, a pandemic, or a natural disaster. The organization must have a crisis response and recovery plan, defined responsibilities, and appropriately qualified personnel. The should-level adds requirements for methods to detect emerging crises, a procedure to invoke crisis management, and documented strategic priorities for crisis situations. For high protection needs, a set of relevant crisis scenarios must have been identified, covering key personnel unavailability, facility unavailability, and major cyberattacks, with corresponding response plans. For very high protection needs, full crisis exercises and simulations involving all relevant decision-makers must be conducted regularly.

Evidence includes a crisis management plan, documented responsibilities, evidence of tested scenarios, and exercise reports.

 

The post ISA VDA 6.0.3 (part 2) — Information Security Sheet: IS Policies and Organization first appeared on Sorin Mustaca – Security & Technology.

TISAX getting started: A Deep Dive into the ISA Assessment Workbook (part 1)

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TISAX — the Trusted Information Security Assessment Exchange — or Trusted ISA Exchange – is the automotive industry’s answer to a decades-old problem: every OEM was running its own supplier security questionnaire, and tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers were drowning in redundant audits. ENX Association, backed by the VDA (Verband der Automobilindustrie), formalized the exchange mechanism in 2017.

The result is a scheme where a single audit, conducted by an accredited assessment service provider (ASP), yields a result that any participating OEM can query via the ENX portal — no re-auditing required.

This series of articles is describing the requirements of the ISA and providing some insights.

 

How to get started

1. Download the TISAX Participant Handbook TISAX

This handbook applies to all TISAX processes that you may be part of. It contains all you need to know to run through the TISAX process. The handbook offers some advice on how to deal with the information security requirements at the core of the assessment.

But it does not aim to generally educate you on what you need to do to pass the information security assessment. Yes, you still need someone who actually understands how the controls in the next document.

2. Download the technical backbone of TISAX  – the ISA — Information Security Assessment –  currently at version 6.0.3 from here: workbook . The ISA is published by the VDA as an Excel workbook and serves simultaneously as the questionnaire, the scoring model, and the audit evidence tracker. Understanding its structure is not optional for any organization preparing for a TISAX assessment; it is the map of exactly what an auditor will walk through on-site.

What to do if you are a small company

For a small company, the TISAX assessment can be overwhelmingly complicated and … very expensive.
My advice to all small companies is to have a conversation with your TISAX certified customer which asked you to provide the label about the real needs.

In my experience, you can ask them to give you their Security Self-Assessment for Suppliers document (usually an Excel or PDF document) and you can fill it in.

Of course, you should be compliant to most of the security controls mentioned there.

If you think you are, you can fill in that document and discuss.

If you see clearly that you are not compliant, then try to negotiate down the requirements, focus on those that do not directly apply to the work you are doing for the customer.

If your customer wants to have a long-term working engagement with you (becoming a client) then it will have to make some compromises. Don’t forget that the bigger your company gets, the more important the security controls are.

If you will engage with other customers, in the end it might be that it makes perfect sense to become TISAX certified.

 

Assessment Levels and Label Scopes

Before examining the workbook itself, one distinction shapes everything: the Assessment Level.

  • AL1 is a self-assessment with no on-site verification.
  • AL2 requires a remote audit by an accredited ASP with evidence review and remote interviews.
  • AL3 demands a lot of preparation since it requires ultimately a mandatory on-site audit. Before the on-site audit, there is a phase for submitting evidence and having remote online interviews with key stakeholders. It is suitable for the highest-sensitivity scenarios — handling classified vehicle data, prototypes under embargo, or personal data processed on behalf of an OEM under GDPR data processor obligations.

Most suppliers in the automotive supply chain will be assessed at AL2 or AL3. The label a company requires determines which subset of the ISA they are audited against:Very High Protection Need, High Protection Need, Prototype Protection, or Data Protection .

The ISA workbook is structured to reflect this: it contains sheets for each major assessment domain, and the applicable controls per domain depend on the label scope agreed between the OEM and the supplier.

 

My company offers consulting on how to prepare for a TISAX and ISO27001 audit.

Get in touch with us here: https://www.endpoint-cybersecurity.com/contact/

The Workbook Sheet by Sheet

I will write separate articles about the important sheets: Information Security (part 2) and Data Protection (part 3).

 

Sheet 1 — Cover / Overview

The first sheet is the administrative header of the entire assessment. It captures the organization’s name, the assessment scope (which legal entity, which sites, which processes are in scope), the applicable label(s), and the assessment level. In practice, this sheet is also where the ASP documents the assessment date, the lead assessor’s identity, and the version of the ISA being used.

From an ISMS perspective, this sheet maps directly to the context of the organization requirement in ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (Clause 4). An organization that has already defined its ISMS scope in a formal Scope Statement will find that most of the Cover sheet data is already governed — the TISAX scope and the ISMS scope should be congruent, and any divergence is itself an audit finding waiting to happen.

 

Sheet 2 — Maturity Levels Reference

The ISA uses a six-level maturity scale (0 through 5) derived from the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) concept. Level 0 means the control is absent or completely ineffective. Level 5 means the control is continuously optimized and benchmarked. For a standard AL2 audit, the target threshold is level 3 (“established”) across applicable controls — meaning the process is documented, implemented, and verifiably practiced. AL3 assessments hold the same threshold but with more rigorous evidence scrutiny on-site.

This reference sheet is the normative scoring anchor for the entire workbook. Every self-assessment score entered elsewhere is implicitly a claim against these definitions, and auditors will challenge any score they cannot corroborate with observable evidence.

The ISMS parallel here is ISO 27001:2022 and ISO 27001:2013 Annex A combined with the organization’s Statement of Applicability. Just as the SoA records which controls apply and why, the maturity sheet defines what “implemented” means in quantified terms. Organizations that conflate “we have a policy” (Level 2) with “the policy is consistently followed and verified” (Level 3) routinely discover the gap when the auditor arrives.

Sheet 3 — Information Security (IS)

This is the largest and most foundational sheet in the workbook. It covers the full ISMS domain: organizational security, HR security, physical security, IT and network security, incident management, business continuity, cryptography, and supplier/third-party management. The controls are numbered in the VDA’s own scheme (e.g., 1.1.x, 1.2.x, 5.1.x) and each control row contains a requirement description, a column for the maturity self-assessment score, and columns for comments and evidence references.

The IS sheet is effectively a structured overlay on top of ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A (now restructured in the 2022 edition into four themes: Organizational, People, Physical, and Technological). The coverage is not identical — the ISA adds automotive-specific weight to areas like remote access for manufacturing systems, network segmentation between office and OT environments, and patch management for embedded systems. But the conceptual architecture is the same, and an organization holding an ISO 27001 certification will recognize every clause.

For ISMS practitioners, the critical translation exercise is mapping existing controls documentation (policies, procedures, risk treatment plans) to specific ISA control rows. The ISA does not accept “we are ISO 27001 certified” as a passing score; the auditor will still verify implementation evidence row by row. Certification reduces preparation effort but does not substitute for it.

Sheet 4 — Prototype Protection (PP)

The Prototype Protection sheet addresses a risk specific to the automotive industry: pre-production vehicles, components, and data carry enormous competitive value. Photographs of an unreleased platform at a supplier’s facility have ended up in press publications before launch day more than once. This sheet governs the physical and logical protection of prototype parts and vehicles when they are handled by suppliers — covering receiving and storage, access control to prototype areas, handling of prototype data in digital form (CAD files, test results, specification documents), and obligations when prototypes are transported or loaned.

The PP sheet has no direct ISO 27001 Annex A equivalent, though it draws on physical security principles from that standard. Its closest ISMS relatives are the asset classification and handling controls (A.5.9–A.5.13 in ISO 27001:2022) and the physical security perimeter controls (A.7.1–A.7.4). Organizations that handle prototypes but have not explicitly extended their ISMS asset register to cover physical prototype inventory — and their ISMS physical security controls to cover prototype bays specifically — will find gaps here.

The Prototype Protection label is only triggered when an OEM explicitly requires it in the exchange request. Not every supplier will be assessed on this sheet, but those who are should expect the auditor to physically walk the relevant areas.

Sheet 5 — Data Protection (DP)

The Data Protection sheet was substantially expanded in ISA 6.x to reflect the obligations introduced by GDPR for automotive suppliers acting as data processors on behalf of OEMs. It covers the legal basis for personal data processing, ROPA (Records of Processing Activities) maintenance, data subject rights procedures, DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment) processes for high-risk processing, technical and organizational measures (TOMs) as required under GDPR Article 32, data breach notification timelines, and SCCs (Standard Contractual Clauses) for international data transfers.

From an ISMS alignment perspective, this sheet crosses a boundary: it is no longer purely an information security matter but a legal compliance matter rooted in Regulation (EU) 2016/679. ISO 27001 does not fully satisfy the DP sheet — ISO/IEC 27701:2019 (the Privacy Information Management System extension to 27001) is the closest standards-based alignment. Organizations that have implemented 27701 or maintained a structured GDPR compliance program will have significant coverage, but the ISA’s DP sheet is more prescriptive and automotive-context-specific than the generic 27701 controls.

The Data Protection label, like the Prototype Protection label, is triggered selectively. Suppliers who process employee or end-customer personal data on behalf of an OEM — telematics data processors are the clearest example — will routinely be required to achieve it.

Sheet 6 — Results / Summary

The final sheet aggregates the per-control scores from the assessment sheets into domain-level and overall maturity summaries. It typically presents a radar or bar visualization of maturity per domain and flags controls scored below the threshold, which constitute findings. Findings are classified as either major (blocking label issuance) or minor (requiring a remediation plan within a defined timeframe, typically 6–12 months).

For audit management purposes, this sheet is the executive communication artifact. It is what a CISO presents to the board when reporting TISAX readiness, and it is what the ASP uses to structure the final assessment report submitted to ENX. In an ISMS context, this sheet’s function mirrors the management review output required under ISO 27001 Clause 9.3 — a documented evidence of the current state of the security posture, with identified nonconformities and corrective action owners.

 

The Practical Implication

The ISA workbook is not a compliance checklist to be filled in once every three years, even if it is know that this is a common practice among small-medium companies.

It is supposed to be a living snapshot of a security posture. Organizations that treat it as a periodic exercise tend to discover, during reassessment, that improvements logged in the previous cycle were never fully operationalized.

The workbook’s value is highest when it is maintained continuously as a management tool — updated as the threat landscape changes, as new processing activities begin, as infrastructure is modified, and as supply chain relationships evolve.

For companies already operating an ISO 27001-compliant ISMS, the ISA workbook is best understood as the automotive industry’s structured lens on that ISMS: it asks the same fundamental questions about governance, risk, and control, but through the specific context of the VDA’s risk model and the contractual obligations of the automotive supply chain.

Closing the gap between the two is the core of any effective TISAX preparation program.

 

How about doing everything with AI ?

AI can help, but can’t solve the problem for you. Well, you can try, but the results are … well, I better let you test it yourself.
The problem is that you need to run through the AI all your ISMS (all policies, procedures) and compare its content with the controls in ISA.
But this is not everything: you not only need to map policies to controls, you must also provide the right evidence for them. This is very problematic, since no AI at this point in time is able to comprehend the multitude of types of evidence: logs, pictures, powerpoint presentations, xls documents, etc.

I have not seen this working good so far in several AI-powered solutions on the market.

Btw, those solutions are LLMs trained with a lot of context for the respective certification and they are not made to work just for TISAX. That’s why they don’t work good.

 

 

My company offers consulting on how to prepare for a TISAX and ISO27001 audit.

Get in touch with us here: https://www.endpoint-cybersecurity.com/contact/

 

The post TISAX getting started: A Deep Dive into the ISA Assessment Workbook (part 1) first appeared on Sorin Mustaca – Security & Technology.

NIS2 Fulfillment through TISAX Assessment and ISA6

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ENX has released an interesting article about how NIS2 requirements map to TISAX requirements. For this, there is a short introductory article called “TISAX and Cybersecurity in Industry – Expert Analysis Confirms NIS2 Coverage” and

and a full article of 75 pages : https://enx.com/TISAX-NIS2-en.pdf

An analysis conducted within ENX’s expert working groups examined how well a TISAX assessment based on the ISA6 catalog aligns with the requirements of the NIS2 Directive.

The key findings include:

  • All relevant NIS2 requirements are addressed, including risk management, incident response, supply chain security, governance, and technical safeguards.
  • TISAX goes beyond minimum legal requirements, incorporating structured maturity assessments, systematic vulnerability management, and continuous improvement mechanisms.
  • The established three-year assessment cycle is considered appropriate in the context of NIS2.
  • TISAX labels are publicly accessible via the ENX database, enabling transparent verification.
  • Additional national requirements must be addressed separately. This includes, in particular, country-specific reporting obligations to authorities or national CSIRTs. While not part of the TISAX standard, these requirements can be effectively managed using existing TISAX structures.

 

Here is the summary of the PDF above created with NotebookLM (9 pages):

Detailed Briefing Document: NIS2 Fulfillment Through TISAX

Date: October 26, 2023 Prepared for: Key Stakeholders concerned with NIS2 Compliance in the Automotive Industry Subject: Review of the “NIS2 fulfilment through TISAX” Expert Opinion, detailing how TISAX assessments align with NIS2 Directive requirements.

Executive Summary

The automotive industry, through the ENX Association and the ISA requirements catalogue, has proactively addressed cybersecurity for years, culminating in the TISAX assessment standard established in 2017. This expert opinion, published by the ENX Association, concludes that companies with TISAX-compliant sites fully implement the requirements of the NIS2 Directive. The ISA catalogue and TISAX assessments go beyond NIS2 requirements, defining and continuously upholding the “state of the art” in information and cybersecurity for the industry. Independent auditors confirm implementation in a three-year cycle, deemed appropriate even when compared to the two-year cycle for critical infrastructure operators under German law. A common exchange mechanism allows organizations to query TISAX status and, by extension, NIS2 compliance, of partners.

Key Takeaway: Organizations with a valid TISAX label are generally well-prepared for the material requirements of NIS2, with the caveat that they must still manage national reporting requirements in parallel and ensure that their TISAX assessment objectives reflect their overall risk and cover all NIS2-affected sites.

1. Introduction and Overview of NIS2 and TISAX

The NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 aims to strengthen cyber resilience across the European Union, replacing the NIS1 Directive. It expands the scope of affected organizations, including many in the automotive industry. The automotive industry recognized the need for industry-wide information and cybersecurity and developed the TISAX Assessment standard and its underlying ISA requirements catalogue. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that TISAX assessments, based on ISA6, can be considered proof of compliance with NIS2 requirements.

  • Purpose of Analysis: To assist companies in the automotive industry in assessing whether TISAX compliance covers NIS2 requirements.
  • Scope of Analysis: Focuses exclusively on NIS2 Directive requirements with specific implementation guidelines for companies. It does not provide implementation assistance or confirm a company’s readiness for NIS2 outside of TISAX. Country-specific implementations and additional material requirements are not covered.
  • Target Audience: Experts from companies affected by NIS2 that use or undergo TISAX assessments, and authorities responsible for NIS2 compliance and supervision.

2. TISAX Assessment and Underlying Catalogue of Requirements (ISA6)

TISAX assessments, conducted by independent auditors in a three-year cycle, are based on ISA catalogue version 6 (ISA6). A critical distinction is made between TISAX scope definition and ISO management system certifications:

  • TISAX Assessment Scope: Utilizes a generally defined standard scope, ensuring comparability and a similar level of security across companies. This contrasts with ISO/IEC 27001, where the audited organization defines its ISMS scope. For the conclusions of this document to apply, TISAX Assessment objectives must reflect the company’s overall risk, and all NIS2-affected sites must have corresponding TISAX labels.
  • TISAX Assessment Objectives: Allow for scaling the assessment content based on risk and criticality of information processed (e.g., Confidential, Strictly Confidential, High Availability, Very High Availability, Data, Special Data, Prototype Protection).
  • TISAX Assessment Levels (AL):AL 1: Self-assessment, auditor checks completion, low confidence, not used in TISAX.
  • AL 2: Auditor performs plausibility check of self-assessment, checks evidence, conducts interviews (usually web conference).
  • AL 3: Comprehensive review, auditor verifies documents, conducts planned and unplanned interviews, observes implementation, and considers local conditions. Generally takes place on-site at all locations.
  • If multiple objectives are used, the highest AL is applied to the overall assessment.
  • TISAX Group Assessments (Simplified Group Assessment – SGA): Designed for companies with many locations and a centralized, highly developed ISMS.
  • S-SGA (Sample-based): Main site extensively assessed, sample sites assessed, other sites assessed at one AL lower.
  • R-SGA (Rotating Schedule-based): Main site extensively assessed, other locations assessed at the same AL but distributed over the three-year validity period. Not available for prototype protection objectives.
  • TISAX Control Questions and Requirements:Requirements are categorized (Must, Should, Additional requirements for high protection needs, Additional requirements for very high protection needs, Additional requirements for SGA).
  • “Must” requirements are strict, “Should” allows for justified deviations.
  • Additional requirements are subdivided by protection objectives (Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), Availability (A)).
  • Individual control questions cannot be excluded as “not applicable”; they must be implemented holistically.
  • Deviations in TISAX Model: TISAX includes a maturity model (six levels, target is “established”) to assess practical implementation. Identified deviations require corrective action plans with defined implementation periods (up to 3, 6, or 9 months). Failure to correct deviations results in a failed audit.
  • Validity Period: TISAX assessments are valid for three years. Companies must continuously implement specified measures, conduct regular internal audits, and report significant changes affecting the ISMS or physical conditions, potentially requiring interim assessments.

3. NIS2 Article 20: Governance and Training

NIS2 Article 20 focuses on the governance body’s responsibility for cybersecurity risk management and their participation in relevant training.

  • NIS2 Article 20 (1): Governing Body’s Role in Risk Management: Requires the governing body to establish and monitor structures for cybersecurity risk management.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Fully covered by ISA6 controls (1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.4.1, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 7.1.1). These controls check for defined ISMS scope, determined requirements, management commissioning and approval of ISMS, communication channels, regular reviews of ISMS effectiveness, defined responsibilities, resource availability, adequate security structure, qualified employees, conflict of interest avoidance, regular risk assessments, risk classification and allocation, security risk handling, compliance verification, independent ISMS reviews, and consideration of regulatory/contractual provisions.
  • Summary: “The requirement that the governing body of an organization has created appropriate structures to implement and monitor the implementation of the cybersecurity risk management measures taken to comply with Article 21 (NIS2 Article 20 (1)) is described by the controls defined in the ISA6 assessment standard and is fully checked for existence and implementation by the responsible auditor within a TISAX assessment.” The three-year TISAX cycle is considered appropriate given NIS2’s risk-based approach.
  • NIS2 Article 20 (2): Training for Governing Body and Relevant Members: Requires regular training for governing body members and other relevant individuals to acquire sufficient knowledge and skills in cybersecurity risk identification, assessment, and management.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Checked by ISA6 control 2.1.3 (“To what extent is staff made aware of and trained with respect to the risks arising from the handling of information?”). This includes comprehensive training for all employees (including management), an awareness training concept covering relevant areas, consideration of target groups, regular execution, and documentation of participation.
  • Summary: While ISA does not explicitly list “management body” for training, it mandates training for “all employees” and differentiation by “target group,” implicitly covering management. This ensures the requirements of NIS2 Article 20 (2) are met.

4. NIS2 Article 21: Risk Management Measures

NIS2 Article 21 mandates appropriate and proportionate technical, operational, and organizational measures to manage risks to network and information systems.

  • NIS2 Article 21 (1): General Measures for Risk Management: Requires appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks and minimize incident impact, considering the state of the art and implementation costs.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Covered by ISA6 controls 1.2.1 (“To what extent is information security managed within the organization?”) and 1.4.1 (“To what extent are information security risks managed?”). These check for defined ISMS scope, determined requirements, existence and regular updating of risk assessments, assignment of risk owners, and action plans for risks.
  • Summary: “The requirements of NIS2 Article 21 (1) are described by the controls defined in the ISA6 assessment standard and are checked for existence and implementation by the auditor responsible during a TISAX assessment.” The TISAX assessment ensures a risk-based approach tailored to the company’s circumstances.
  • NIS2 Article 21 (2) a) – j): Specific Measures: These sub-articles detail specific areas for cybersecurity measures.
  • a) Policies on Risk Analysis and Information System Security: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.4.1, 5.2.7, 5.3.1, checking for procedures to identify, assess, and address risks, network management requirements, and information security consideration in new/developed IT systems.
  • b) Incident Handling: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.6.1, 1.6.2, checking for definition of reportable events, reporting channels, communication strategies, and incident processing procedures (categorization, qualification, prioritization, response, escalation). “The processes for detection, reporting channels and procedures, classification, processing and escalation (if necessary), go beyond the requirements stipulated in NIS2.”
  • c) Business Continuity, Backup Management, Disaster Recovery, Crisis Management: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.6.3, 5.2.8, 5.2.9, checking for crisis management preparedness, IT service continuity planning, and backup/recovery of data and IT services.
  • d) Supply Chain Security: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.2.4, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.6.2, 1.6.3, 5.3.3, 6.1.1, 6.1.2. This includes defining responsibilities with external IT service providers, ensuring use of evaluated services, incident reporting and management from external parties, secure removal of information from external services, ensuring information security among contractors and partners, and contractual non-disclosure agreements. “The requirements in the ISA6 assessment standard go beyond the requirements of NIS2 and additionally include, for example, compliance with information security standards beyond the direct providers or service providers.”
  • e) Security in Network and Information Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance (including vulnerability handling): Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.4, 5.2.1, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4. This extensive coverage includes considering information security in projects, responsibilities with external IT service providers, approved software usage, change management, event logging, vulnerability identification and addressing, technical checks of IT systems, security in new/developed IT systems, network service requirements, and information protection in shared external services. “The assessment goes beyond the requirements of NIS2 by considering the return and secure removal of information assets from IT services outside the organization.”
  • f) Policies and Procedures to Assess Effectiveness of Cybersecurity Risk-Management Measures: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.2.1, 1.4.1, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 1.6.2, 5.2.6, checking for regular review of ISMS effectiveness by management, up-to-date risk assessments, regular compliance checks, independent ISMS reviews, continuous improvement based on security events, and regular technical audits of IT systems and services. The three-year cycle is considered appropriate.
  • g) Basic Cyber Hygiene Practices and Cybersecurity Training: Covered by a wide range of ISA6 controls (1.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 4.1.3, 4.2.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.2.8, 5.2.9, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4). This includes information security policies, contractual obligations for staff, comprehensive training, secure management of user accounts/login info, access rights management, cryptographic procedures, information protection during transfer, change management, separation of environments, malware protection, event logging, vulnerability management, technical audits, network management, continuity planning, backup/recovery, and secure handling of information assets.
  • h) Policies and Procedures Regarding Cryptography and Encryption: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 5.1.1, 5.1.2, checking for adherence to industry standards, technical rules, lifecycle management of cryptographic keys, key sovereignty, and protection of information during transfer (including encryption).
  • i) Human Resources Security, Access Control Policies, and Asset Management: Fully covered by a comprehensive set of ISA6 controls (1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.2.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.2.8, 5.2.9). This includes identification and classification of information assets, use of approved external IT services, employee qualification for sensitive roles, contractual obligations, training, mobile work regulations, handling of supporting assets, mobile device management, identification means management, user access security, user account/login info management, access rights, change management, separation of environments, malware protection, event logging, vulnerability management, technical audits, network management, continuity planning, and backup/recovery.
  • j) Multi-factor Authentication, Continuous Authentication, Secured Communications, and Emergency Communication Systems: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.6.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 5.1.2, 5.2.8. This involves crisis planning for communication, user authentication procedures (including strong authentication/MFA for privileged accounts), secure management of user accounts/login info, protection of information during transfer (secure voice/video/text communication), and continuity planning that includes alternative communication strategies.
  • NIS2 Article 21 (4): Immediate Corrective Measures for Non-Compliance: Requires immediate necessary, appropriate, and proportionate corrective measures upon awareness of non-compliance with Article 21 (2) measures.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Fully covered by ISA6 controls 1.5.1, 1.5.2, checking for verification of policy observation, regular review of policies/procedures, documented results, regular compliance checks, and initiation/pursuit of corrective measures based on internal and independent reviews. The three-year cycle is deemed appropriate.

5. NIS2 Article 23: Incident Reporting

NIS2 Article 23 outlines requirements for reporting security incidents.

  • NIS2 Article 23 (1): Notification of Significant Security Incidents: Essential and important entities must notify their CSIRT or competent authority without undue delay of significant security incidents. Recipients of services must also be informed immediately. Information enabling cross-border impact determination must be provided.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Almost fully met by ISA6 controls 1.6.1, 1.6.2. These check for defined reportable events, known reporting mechanisms based on severity, available reporting channels, handling of events by category, knowledge of reporting obligations and contact information, and communication strategies.
  • Summary: “One exception here is the disclosure of cross-border effects, which is not explicitly required within the ISA. It has already been defined here that emergency communication must be expanded to include the specifications from NIS2. Once this extension has been considered, the requirements are fully met.”
  • NIS2 Article 23 (2): Communication of Remedial Actions to Recipients: Entities must promptly communicate to affected recipients any measures or remedial actions they can take in response to a significant cyber threat, and inform them of the threat itself.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Covered by ISA6 control 1.6.2. This includes categorization, qualification, and prioritization of reported events, appropriate responses, and communication strategies considering target recipients and reporting periods.
  • Summary: “The explicit contact information, reporting channels and languages must be included in the Business Continuity Management (BCM) by the companies following their publication by the EU member states. The auditor cannot guarantee that this information is available, as the information to be included is company-specific and can therefore take a variety of forms.”
  • NIS2 Article 23 (3): Definition of Significant Security Incident: Provides an informative definition (serious disruption or financial/material/immaterial damage).
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Purely informative, no assessable measures.
  • NIS2 Article 23 (4): Reporting Timelines and Content: Specifies detailed reporting timelines (early warning within 24 hours, incident notification within 72 hours, intermediate reports, final report within one month).
  • TISAX Fulfilment: Covered by ISA6 controls 1.6.1, 1.6.2, 1.6.3. These check for defined reportable events, mechanisms based on severity, accessible reporting channels, obligation to report, feedback procedures, categorization/prioritization, maximum response times, escalation, and crisis communication strategy.
  • Summary: “In addition to the knowledge and existence of the necessary reporting channels and deadlines, the ISA standard also requires the establishment of crisis-proof communication. At this point, the requirements of the ISA go beyond the requirements of NIS2.” Similar to 23(2), explicit contact information and channels are company-specific and not directly assessed by TISAX.
  • NIS2 Article 23 (5-11): No explicit demands on affected companies requiring preparatory measures.

6. NIS2 Article 24

  • NIS2 Article 24 (1): No explicit demands on affected companies that require preparatory measures.
  • TISAX Fulfilment: No assessable measures.

7. NIS2 Article 25: European and International Standards

NIS2 Article 25 addresses the application of European and international standards for network and information system security.

  • TISAX Fulfilment: “The requirements of NIS2 Article 25 to use European and international standards and technical specifications for the security of network and information systems to ensure the implementation of the requirements for companies resulting from NIS2 are met by an audit of an organization’s ISMS carried out in accordance with TISAX, as this report demonstrates.” No explicit demands for preparatory measures are made on companies.

8. NIS2 Articles 22, 26-29

  • NIS2 Article 22: Coordinated Risk Assessments for Critical Supply Chains: No specific requirements for companies, not considered further in this report.
  • NIS2 Articles 26-28 (Jurisdiction, Register of Entities, Domain Name Registration Data): No measures to be examined for companies, not considered in this document.
  • NIS2 Article 29: Exchange of Cybersecurity Information: “The requirements of NIS2 Article 29 are not assessed within the TISAX assessment.”

9. Overall Summary and Conclusion

The “NIS2 fulfilment through TISAX” document strongly asserts that TISAX assessments, based on the ISA requirements catalogue, provide comprehensive evidence that companies meet the material requirements of the NIS2 Directive.

  • State of the Art: ISA and TISAX are considered “state of the art” for information and cybersecurity in the automotive industry due to their continuous development by experts, application by thousands of companies, and resulting knowledge gain.
  • Management Responsibility and Risk Management: A TISAX label indicates that the management of an assessed company fulfills the responsibility required in NIS2 Article 20 and has implemented all state-of-the-art risk management measures of Article 21, provided the assessment objectives reflect overall risk and all NIS2-affected sites were included.
  • Audit Cycle: The three-year TISAX audit cycle is deemed appropriate, even compared to the two-year cycle for critical infrastructure operators under German law, due to the continuous monitoring and documentation obligations within the cycle.
  • Preparation for NIS2: Companies with a valid TISAX label are “well positioned to meet the requirements of the NIS2 directive in these areas.”
  • Reporting Requirements: TISAX provides proof of established mechanisms for mandatory reporting to authorities and customers. However, companies are responsible for integrating country-specific additional requirements and verifying them against implemented measures.

In essence, TISAX is presented as a robust framework that aligns with and often exceeds the cybersecurity requirements set forth by NIS2 for the automotive sector.

 

 

The post NIS2 Fulfillment through TISAX Assessment and ISA6 first appeared on Sorin Mustaca’s blog.

ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX: overlaps and differences

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Introduction

ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX VDA ISA 6.0 are two prominent standards in the realm of information security management, particularly within the automotive industry. While ISO 27001 provides a global framework for establishing, implementing, maintaining, and continually improving an information security management system (ISMS), TISAX (Trusted Information Security Assessment Exchange), based on the VDA ISA (Information Security Assessment) framework, is tailored to meet the specific needs of the automotive sector.

This article delves into the nuances of these two standards, highlighting their overlaps, the ways in which TISAX leverages ISO 27001, and the distinct features that set TISAX apart.

Overview of ISO 27001:2022

ISO 27001:2022 is the latest revision of the internationally recognized standard for information security management. It provides a comprehensive approach to managing sensitive company information so that it remains secure. This involves a risk management process, which includes people, processes, and IT systems by applying a risk management process.

Key Features of ISO 27001:2022

  • Risk-Based Approach: Emphasizes the identification and management of risks through a continuous improvement process.
  • Annex A Controls: Contains 93 controls categorized under four themes: Organizational, People, Physical, and Technological.
  • PDCA Cycle: The Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle is integral for continuous improvement.
  • Context of the Organization: Requires understanding of internal and external factors impacting information security.
  • Leadership Commitment: Highlights the importance of top management’s involvement in the ISMS.

Overview of TISAX VDA ISA 6.0

TISAX, a standard specific to the automotive industry, is based on the VDA ISA (Verband der Automobilindustrie Information Security Assessment) catalog. TISAX ensures that automotive manufacturers and suppliers meet strict information security requirements to protect sensitive information.

Key Features of TISAX VDA ISA 6.0

  • Sector-Specific: Tailored specifically for the automotive industry.
  • VDA ISA Catalog: Based on the VDA ISA framework, which is a detailed checklist of requirements and controls. It is split in several areas of interest:
    • Information security – containing everything that belongs to an ISMS
      • IS Policies and Organization
      • Information Security Policies
      • Organization of Information Security
      • Asset Management
      • IS Risk Management
      • Assessments
      • Incident and Crisis Management
      • Human Resources
      • Physical Security
      • Identity and Access Management
      • Identity Management
      • Access Management
      • IT Security / Cyber Security
      • Cryptography
      • Operations Security
      • System acquisitions, requirement management and development
      • Supplier Relationships
      • Compliance
    • Prototype Protection – focused on physical and cyber protection of prototypes
    • Data Protection – focused on policies for protecting privacy and secrets
  • Assessment Levels: Comprises different levels of assessment depending on the type of information and its criticality.
  • Labeling System: Provides a TISAX label indicating compliance, which can be shared with partners within the automotive ecosystem.
  • Focus on KPIs: VDA ISA provides a large set of examples on how to measure certain controls effectively.

Overlaps between ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX VDA ISA 6.0

While TISAX and ISO 27001 serve different purposes, they share several common elements. TISAX leverages the fundamental principles of ISO 27001, creating a robust framework that is both comprehensive and specific to the automotive sector.

In the VDA ISA 6.x (and previous) there are the columns “Reference to other standards” (column P) and “Reference to implementation guidance” (column Q) which point to known standards. Of course, there is no coincidence that the most reference standard is the ISO 27001 in both versions 2022 and 2013.

In the guidance we usually see reference to the Annex A of the ISO 27001 standard (both versions).

 

In the column W there is “Further information” containing explanations of what can be described by the respective control.

Risk Management

Both ISO 27001 and TISAX emphasize a risk-based approach to information security. ISO 27001 mandates a formal risk assessment process, while TISAX incorporates this through the VDA ISA requirements, ensuring that organizations identify and manage risks relevant to the automotive industry.

Control Objectives and Controls

ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX VDA ISA 6.0 share a common structure in terms of control objectives and specific controls. Many of the controls listed in Annex A of ISO 27001 are reflected in the VDA ISA catalog, ensuring a comprehensive approach to securing information.

While this is a common trait shared by the standards, the TISAX is making use of other standards than ISO 27001: NIST, BSI other ISO standards.

Continuous Improvement

Both standards advocate for continuous improvement. ISO 27001’s PDCA cycle and TISAX’s periodic reassessment and updating of security measures ensure that organizations continually enhance their security posture in response to evolving threats.

TISAX VDA ISA has a sheet called “Maturity Levels” containing descriptions of the Maturity Levels 0 to 5.

Documentation and Record-Keeping

ISO 27001 requires detailed documentation of the ISMS, including risk assessments, policies, and procedures. TISAX also mandates thorough documentation as part of its assessment criteria, ensuring that organizations maintain a clear record of their security practices.

Third-Party Management/Suppliers Relationships

Third-party risk management is a critical component in both standards. ISO 27001 includes controls for managing supplier relationships and ensuring their compliance with information security requirements. Similarly, TISAX places a strong emphasis on securing information exchanged with suppliers and partners, crucial for maintaining the integrity of the automotive supply chain.

Differences between ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX VDA ISA 6.0

Despite their overlaps, ISO 27001 and TISAX have several distinctions, reflecting their different scopes and target audiences.

Industry Focus

ISO 27001 is a generic standard applicable to any organization, regardless of its sector. TISAX, however, is designed specifically for the automotive industry, addressing unique challenges such as the secure exchange of data between manufacturers and suppliers.

Assessment Process

ISO 27001 involves a formal certification process conducted by accredited bodies, leading to ISO 27001 certification. TISAX, on the other hand, employs a mutual assessment model where organizations are assessed by ENX approved audit providers, and successful assessments result in a TISAX label. This label can then be shared with other automotive industry stakeholders, facilitating trust and compliance.

Control Specificity

While ISO 27001 provides a broad framework of controls applicable to various industries, TISAX’s controls are highly specific to the automotive sector. The VDA ISA catalog includes detailed requirements for protecting manufacturing data, ensuring compliance with industry-specific regulations, and safeguarding automotive intellectual property.

Levels of Assessment

TISAX introduces different levels of assessment (Basic(Must and Should), High, and Very High) depending on the sensitivity and criticality of the information being protected. ISO 27001 does not have a tiered assessment system but rather a uniform certification standard.

Focus Areas

TISAX places significant emphasis on physical security, secure development of automotive products, and compliance with industry-specific legal requirements. ISO 27001, while comprehensive, does not delve into sector-specific issues with the same level of detail.

Commercial vs Open standards

ISO 27001 is an open international standard governed by the Internation Standards Organisation (ISO). The TISAX trademark is owned by the organization ENX, formed by many OEMs in automotive sector.

 

Implementation of TISAX Using ISO 27001

TISAX leverages ISO 27001’s framework to build a robust and industry-specific information security system. Many organizations begin with ISO 27001 certification and then adapt their ISMS to meet the additional requirements of TISAX.

Integration of Standards

  1. Foundation in ISO 27001: Organizations often establish a basic ISMS in accordance with ISO 27001. This includes conducting risk assessments, implementing controls, and ensuring continuous improvement.
  2. Customization to TISAX Requirements: Once the foundational ISMS is in place, organizations tailor it to meet TISAX requirements, which may involve additional controls specific to automotive data security and third-party management.
  3. Assessment and Labeling: Organizations undergo a TISAX assessment conducted by an approved audit provider. Successful completion results in the issuance of a TISAX label, demonstrating compliance with industry-specific security requirements.

Benefits of Integration

Integrating ISO 27001 with TISAX offers several benefits:

  • Streamlined Compliance: Simplifies the process of meeting both generic and sector-specific security requirements.
  • Enhanced Trust: The TISAX label, backed by ISO 27001’s rigorous framework, enhances trust among automotive industry partners.
  • Cost Efficiency: Leveraging ISO 27001 as a foundation reduces duplication of effort and resources in implementing security measures.

Conclusion

ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX VDA ISA 6.0 represent critical standards for information security, particularly within the automotive sector. While they share common principles such as risk management and continuous improvement, TISAX’s industry-specific focus and detailed requirements for automotive set it apart. By leveraging the robust framework of ISO 27001, organizations can start to effectively implement TISAX, ensuring comprehensive protection of sensitive automotive data and fostering trust within the industry.

Understanding the connections between these standards and their unique requirements is very important for organizations aiming to achieve a high level of information security and compliance.

The post ISO 27001:2022 and TISAX: overlaps and differences first appeared on Sorin Mustaca on Cybersecurity.

ChatGPT and automotive cybersecurity #2/2: TISAX certification

/in

This is the 2nd post about Automotive Cybersecurity.

Since I am working these days on CSMS (based on ISO ECE 21434 and TISAX), part of my companies consulting offer for automotive I thought maybe I check what ChatGPT things about them.

 

First post was about CSMS and ISO 21434 and this one is about TISAX.

 

Query:

Tell me about challenges in TISAX certification 

 

ChatGPT:

“TISAX (Trusted Information Security Assessment Exchange) is a security assessment and certification process for automotive suppliers. The certification is used to evaluate and ensure the information security capabilities of companies in the automotive sector.

There are several challenges associated with TISAX certification:

  • Complex requirements: TISAX has extensive and complex security requirements that can be difficult to understand and implement. Companies may struggle to meet these requirements and may need help from experts to achieve certification.
  • Resource constraints: Implementing the security measures required for TISAX certification can be resource-intensive and time-consuming. This can be especially challenging for small or medium-sized businesses.
  • Technical difficulties: Companies may face technical challenges in implementing the necessary security controls, particularly if their existing systems are not well-suited to the TISAX requirements.
  • Cost: The cost of TISAX certification can be significant, and this may be a challenge for companies with limited budgets.
  • Maintenance: TISAX certification must be maintained, and companies must continually evaluate and improve their security controls to stay certified. This can be a challenge, as the threat landscape is constantly evolving and new risks emerge.

Overall, TISAX certification requires a substantial investment of time, resources, and expertise, but it is considered an important aspect of information security for companies operating in the automotive sector.”

 

So, I have to say that this impressed me a bit …

I have always difficulties explaining to my customers why is it so hard to pass the TISAX audit.

It is all true, and actually it is quite a challenge to get companies to commit to a long term cooperation with a consulting company, which can help them understand the requirements and teach them how to apply them.

 

Conclusion: 

I will get back to ChatGPT from time to time and try to get such short descriptions for various things I need.

The post ChatGPT and automotive cybersecurity #2/2: TISAX certification first appeared on Sorin Mustaca on Cybersecurity.

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